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Abstract
A wide range of algorithms have been developed for various types of negotiating agents. In developing such algorithms the main focus
has been on their efﬁciency and their effectiveness. However, this is only a part of the picture. Typically, agents negotiate on behalf of
their owners and for this to be effective the agents must be able to adequately represent their owners’ strategies and preferences for
negotiation. However, the process by which such knowledge is acquired is typically left unspeciﬁed. To address this problem, we
undertook a study of how user information about negotiation tradeoff strategies and preferences can be captured. Speciﬁcally, we
devised a novel default-then-adjust acquisition technique. In this, the system ﬁrstly does a structured interview with the user to suggest the
attributes that the tradeoff could be made between, then it asks the user to adjust the suggested default tradeoff strategy by improving
some attribute to see how much worse the attribute being traded off can be made while still being acceptable, and, ﬁnally, it asks the user
to adjust the default preference on the tradeoff alternatives. This method is consistent with the principles of standard negotiation theory
and to demonstrate its effectiveness we implemented a prototype system and performed an empirical evaluation in an accommodation
renting scenario. The result of this evaluation indicates the proposed technique is helpful and efﬁcient in accurately acquiring the users’
tradeoff strategies and preferences.
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Negotiation—the process by which a group of agents
come to a mutually acceptable agreement on some
matter—is a key form of interaction in a wide range of
complex systems (including the Web, the Grid, peer-to-peer
systems, pervasive computing, and e-business). Given its
importance, a wide range of negotiation models have been
developed; these include models for auctions, direct one-to-
one negotiations, and argumentation-based encounters
(see He et al., 2003; Lomuscio et al., 2003 for an overview).
To date, however, research in this ﬁeld has been
almost exclusively concerned with the development of
efﬁcient and effective algorithms that enable agents to be
successful and obtain acceptable outcomes. While this is
clearly important, it is only part of the picture. In
most cases, agents negotiate on behalf of their owner
(which may be an individual or an organisation). Now
for this to be effective, agents must be able to adequately
reﬂect their owners’ interests, strategies, preferences,
and prejudices in the given domain. Without this,
software agents cannot be delegated negotiation tasks.
So, the acquisition of such knowledge is an essential
prerequisite for applying negotiating agents in practice.
However, at this time, little thought has been given to the
problems of determining: (i) exactly what knowledge an
owner needs to impart to their agent in order to achieve
high ﬁdelity negotiation behaviour, and (ii) how such
knowledge can be effectively acquired from the owner.
These are clearly serious shortcomings of existing research
that need to be addressed if negotiating agents are to be
widely used.
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bridging the knowledge acquisition gap between the
negotiating agents’ owners and the negotiation algorithms
that their agents use. Speciﬁcally, in this paper we focus on
exploring how the necessary knowledge about a user’s
negotiation tradeoffs can be acquired. In more detail, the
term tradeoff among negotiation attributes refers to
combinations of attributes’ values in which the worsening
of some attributes is used to get other attributes’ values
improved. The set of all such potential combinations is
called the user’s tradeoff strategy and its individual
elements are called tradeoff alternatives. Some of these
alternatives are more preferred by the users and this
ordering is here referred to as a user’s tradeoff preference.
In this work, such a preference is realised through assigning
each tradeoff alternative a satisfaction degree, where the
more preferred an alternative is, the higher the correspond-
ing satisfaction degree. Moreover, we focus, in particular,
on tradeoffs between pairs of attributes. For example, in an
accommodation renting scenario (which we will use as our
running example throughout this paper), the following
could be a prospective tenant’s tradeoff strategy between
rental rate and period: (i) ‘‘The limit of the rental period I
am willing to accept is 1 week if the rental rate is £325 per
calendar month (pcm)’’, (ii) ‘‘I am willing to increase my
rental period limit to 6 months if I can have the rental rate
of £265 pcm’’, and (iii) ‘‘I am willing to increase my rental
period limit to 12 months if I can have the rental rate of
£250 pcm’’. Moreover, the user may have a preference on
these tradeoff alternatives: thus alternative (i) might be the
least preferred, and alternative (iii) the most preferred.
We choose to focus on tradeoffs because they are a
fundamental aspect of negotiation in both human beha-
viour (e.g., the principled negotiation approach (Fisher and
Ury, 1981)) and in the behaviour of software agents (e.g.,
Mudgal and Vassileva, 2000; Faratin et al., 2002; Cheung
et al., 2003; Luo et al., 2003b; Zhu, 2004). Moreover, since
negotiation participants are normally assumed to be
maximisers of their interest, it is highly unlikely that each
side in a negotiation will be able to get a deal with the best
values of all attributes and, therefore, tradeoffs are
inevitable (Raiffa, 1982). For example, it is normally
impossible for buyers to get a product that is both cheap
and of high quality, or delivered immediately but highly
tailored to the individual’s particular preferences. In this
case, the negotiation participants attempt to minimise the
loss of their overall interest (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Raiffa,
1982). Now this can be achieved by making tradeoffs
between the different attributes. Such tradeoffs become
feasible when the participants have different opinions
about which attributes are more important. For example,
for the attributes price and quantity, it is possible that price
is more important for a buyer but less so for a seller; while
quantity is less important for the buyer but more so for the
seller. Then, the buyer might be willing to concede on
quantity (i.e., buy more) in order to get an agreement with
the seller (i.e., buy more if cheaper), and the seller might be
willing to concede on price (i.e., discount more) to get the
buyer to concede on quantity (i.e., cheaper if buy more).
Through such behaviour, win–win solutions can be reached
(Fisher and Ury, 1981).
In order to ﬁnd possible tradeoff alternatives, one could
naı¨vely construct a value function that is consistent with an
ordering on a small number of tradeoff alternatives (e.g.,
some value combinations of attributes distance and rental
rate in our accommodation renting scenario). Then, any
other tradeoff alternatives could be computed simply by
looking for attribute value combinations that have the
same preference level (e.g., in the accommodation renting
scenario, different distances have different utility values
and so do different rental rates, but their overall utility
value obtained using the chosen value function may have
the same value (Perloff, 1998)). This could be achieved by
arbitrarily picking some attributes and then start worsen-
ing or improving their values while maintaining the overall
preference level. However, for this to work, the following
steps are needed: (i) acquire the user’s preferences on values
of individual attributes (e.g., the utility function of
attribute distance in the accommodation renting scenario);
(ii) ask users to assign a satisfaction degree to a number of
value combinations of individual attributes (e.g., some
value pairs of attributes distance and rental rate); and (iii)
ﬁnd a value function that can aggregate the preferences on
the individual attribute values to produce overall pre-
ference levels that are consistent with users’ satisfaction
degrees for the attribute value combinations. Unfortu-
nately, however, in many situations, the user may be
unwilling or unable to express their preference on single
attribute’s values. For example, when renting some
accommodation, it is difﬁcult to say which rental rate is
preferred more because it depends on other attributes of
the property such as distance, size, Internet connection,
and so on. Rather, it is much easier to indicate which
combination of, say, rental rate and distance, they prefer
more (which is the way the method we propose in this
paper works). There are also a number of other problems
associated with the above approach: (i) there are many
aggregation functions that could be used to obtain the
overall preference levels from the individual attributes’
preference levels (Dubois and Prade, 2004) and it is not
obvious how a user could choose between them (Beliakov
and Warren, 2001); and (ii) it is not obvious how a value
function can be updated in the face of new inconsistent
data.
To overcome these problems with the naı¨ve approach,
our acquisition method works in the following way. First,
conduct a structured interview with the user in order to
suggest the attributes that the tradeoff could or should be
made between. Second, ask users to adjust the suggested
default curve of the tradeoff strategy by improving some
attribute to see how much worse the attribute being traded
off can be made while still being acceptable. For example,
what is the maximum distance away from study that the
renter can accept if the estate agency could decrease the
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suggested default preference on tradeoff alternatives by
adjusting the parameters that conﬁgure the preference.
This default-then-adjust approach is chosen for a number
of reasons. First, in many negotiation scenarios it is not
obvious between which negotiation attributes a tradeoff
should be made. For example, when people buy their ﬁrst
second-hand car, they often have little idea between which
attributes (among model, price, colour, mileage, brand,
manual or automatic, and so on) the tradeoffs could or
should be made. In this situation, they need the help of an
adviser who has the appropriate knowledge. The system
developed in this paper functions as just such an adviser:
after asking a number questions, it suggests the attributes
between which tradeoffs can be made. Second, according
to standard business negotiation theory (Fisher and Ury,
1981; Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982; Unt, 1999), its users
should be allowed to explore the space of tradeoff
alternatives as exhaustively as they are willing to do.
Now, one common technique for doing this is to play
simulated negotiation games in which various negotiation
scenarios are enacted against various human negotiation
partners. So, we design the acquisition system to play the
role of a negotiating opponent which allows the user to
adjust the default tradeoff strategies and preferences as
often or as much as they wish. Third, we want to minimise
the user’s workload, but maximise the ﬂexibility to express
complex tradeoff strategies and preferences where they
exist. In our preliminary work in this area we develop an
exhaustive method (Luo et al., 2004) (much like the naı¨ve
one), but it had the disadvantage that it places a signiﬁcant
burden of work on its users. To counteract this, we
developed a knowledge based method (Luo et al., 2003a)
which lessens the user’s workload, but has the disadvantage
that its users cannot ﬂexibly specify their tradeoff strategies
(actually the system chooses tradeoff strategies for the user
from a ﬁxed number of pre-determined strategies according
to its analysis of the user’s situation). The default-then-
adjust method described in this paper is an amalgam of
these two, retaining both their beneﬁts and removing their
disadvantages. Thus, its users get low workload (by setting
default tradeoff strategies and preferences) and ﬂexibility
to express their individuality (by allowing them to adjust
these defaults).
In developing our method, this paper advances the state
of the art in a number of ways. First, although tradeoffs are
an essential aspect in negotiation, the problem of acquiring
information about them has received little attention in the
research areas of general knowledge acquisition and
preference elicitation. Given the importance of the
problem, our work can be viewed as an initial contribution
to these areas. Second, the limitations of the existing work
in this area (detailed more in Section 6) have been removed.
Actually, the biggest advantage of this approach is the use
of default knowledge. If this default knowledge is close to
either the user’s tradeoff strategy or preference then the
number of steps needed for adjustment is small. Indeed, the
use of such domain knowledge has been found to be
effective in related study (e.g., the work of Haddawy et al.
(2003) uses domain knowledge in a similar manner for
value function elicitation, although the adjustment process
is not via a graphical user interface like ours). Third, we
have developed and evaluated a knowledge acquisition tool
for this task for the domain of accommodation renting.
Our trials show that users ﬁnd it easy to understand and
operate, ﬁnd it helpful to specify their tradeoff strategies
and preferences, and ﬁnd it efﬁcient in terms of the amount
of work involved.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 presents the formal deﬁnition of tradeoff
strategies and preferences and provides a number of
concrete examples of their use. Section 3 outlines the
acquisition method to obtain users’ tradeoff strategies and
preferences. Section 4 presents the associated tool we have
developed and shows how it was used in an accommoda-
tion renting scenario. Section 5 presents an empirical
evaluation of our method and the tool. Section 6 discusses
related work. Finally, Section 7 concludes and outlines
avenues of further research.
2. Representing user tradeoff strategies and preferences
In this section, we deﬁne notions of users’ strategies and
preferences with respect to negotiation tradeoffs between
pairs of attributes that are the most common (Steel and
Beasor, 1999; Collin, 2001).
1 Speciﬁcally, they can be
formally deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 1. Let attribute x take values on X ¼½ lx;ux 
(where lx is the best value of x and ux is the worst one), and
attribute y take values on Y ¼½ ly;uy  (where ly is the best
value of y and uy the worst). Then a mapping t : X ! Y is
a tradeoff strategy between x and y if:
(1) continuity: 8x 2 X;8e40;9d40;jx   x0jod )j tðxÞ
 tðx0Þjoe;
(2) monotonicity: 8x;x0 2 X;xXx03tðxÞptðx0Þ; and
(3) boundary condition: tðlxÞ¼uy;tðuxÞ¼ly.
Thus, 8x 2 X, ðx;tðxÞÞ is a tradeoff alternative which
means that if attribute y takes the value of tðxÞ, the most
the user can accept is x.
In the above deﬁnition, the continuity assumption is
based on the intuition that when a variable changes its
value gradually, the value being traded off should change
in a similarly gradual manner (Mas-Collell et al., 1995; Luo
and Zhang, 1999); the monotonicity condition reﬂects the
essential meaning of a tradeoff: if one attribute is getting
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Collin, 2001); and the boundary condition means that to
get the best value of one attribute, the other has to be made
the worst (this assumption is made because the curve of a
tradeoff strategy needs to be closed at its left and right ends
as shown in Figs. 1–3).
Intuitively, for the same value tðxÞ of attribute y,
different users might have different opinions about how
much worse the value of attribute x (being traded off) can
be made while still being acceptable. By means of
illustration, consider the following examples.
First, if attribute x is much more important to a user
than attribute y, then when he uses y’s good values to
tradeoff x’s very bad ones, he might be willing to make y a
lot worse in order to get x a little better and, moreover, the
worse x is the more he needs to worsen y. For example,
in our accommodation renting scenario (see Fig. 1),
if the student values the rental rate much more than the
walking distance, then when the rental rate is £380
pcm (high) and the walking distance is insigniﬁcant, he
might be willing to increase the walking distance to 15min
(half way to the worst value, or say 30 15
30 ¼ 50% worse) to
get the rental rate reduced to £350 pcm
380 350
380 200 ¼ 16:7% better
  
.
Second, if attribute x is much less important to a user
than attribute y, then when he uses y’s good values to
tradeoff x’s very bad ones, he might be willing to make y
just a little worse in order to get x a lot better and,
moreover, the better y’s value is, the less he needs to worsen
y in order to get x better. For example, if the rental rate is
less important to the student than the walking distance
(Fig. 2), then when the rental rate is £380 pcm and the
walking distance is insigniﬁcant, he might be willing to
increase the walking distance to 8min 8
30 ¼ 26:7% worse
  
in order to reduce the rate to £290 pcm
380 290
380 200 ¼ 50% better
  
.
Third, if attribute x is equally as important as attribute
y, then the user may be willing to worsen y to the same
extent to which x is made better. Thus, if the rental rate is
as important as the walking distance (Fig. 3), then when
the rental rate is £380 pcm and the walking distance is
insigniﬁcant, the user might be willing to increase the
walking distance to 15min 15
30 ¼ 50% worse
  
in order to
reduce the rental rate to £290 pcm 380 290
380 200 ¼ 50% better
  
.
Now, we turn to the concept of tradeoff preference.
First, its formal deﬁnition is given.
Deﬁnition 2. Suppose t is a tradeoff strategy for worsening
attribute y 2½ ly;uy  in order to improve attribute
x 2½ lx;ux . Let lxpapbpcpdpux and T ¼f ð x;tðxÞj
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a little.
Fig. 2. Increasing distance a little to get very high rental rate down a lot.
Fig. 3. Increasing distance to the same extent to which rental rate goes
down.
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preference on T if 8x;x0 2½ lx;ux :
(1) complete dissatisfaction: 8x 2½ lx;a [½ d;ux ;pðx;
tðxÞÞ ¼ 0;
(2) satisfaction increasing: 8x;x0 2½ a;b ;xpx0 ) pðx;tðxÞÞ
ppðx0;tðx0ÞÞ;
(3) complete satisfaction: 8x 2½ b;c ;pðx;tðxÞÞ ¼ 1; and
(4) satisfaction decreasing: 8x;x0 2½ c;d ;xpx0 ) pðx;tðxÞÞ
Xpðx0;tðx0ÞÞ.
Here the preference value of a tradeoff alternative is the
user’s degree of satisfaction with the alternative. In
particular, pðx;tðxÞÞ ¼ 0 reﬂects the fact that the user is
completely dissatisﬁed with ðx;tðxÞÞ;0 opðx;tðxÞÞo1 re-
ﬂects the fact that the bigger the value of pðx;tðxÞÞ the more
the user is satisﬁed with ðx;tðxÞÞ; and pðx;tðxÞÞ ¼ 1 reﬂects
the fact that the user is completely satisﬁed with ðx;tðxÞÞ.
The intuition behind these properties listed in the above
deﬁnition are as follows. First, although worsening
attribute y can lead to an improvement in attribute x,a
user may have a limit tðaÞ for the worst value of attribute y
beyond which he cannot go. That is, if attribute y is worse
than tðaÞ, although attribute x could be made better than a,
the buyer is completely dissatisﬁed with ðx;tðxÞÞ when xpa.
Similarly, although attribute x can be improved by
worsening attribute y, a buyer may have a limit tðaÞ for
the worst value of attribute x, beyond which he cannot go.
Second, the case in which attribute y is beyond its
maximum limit is completely unacceptable. Thus, when
attribute y is getting better (although attribute x is getting
worse a little) he should be increasingly satisﬁed. Third,
when the user’s satisfaction increases to a particular point
ðb;tðbÞÞ, both attributes x and y are acceptable and he is
completely satisﬁed. Fourth, the case in which attribute x is
beyond its maximum limit (e.g., the budget of price) is
completely unacceptable. Thus when attribute x is getting
better by worsening attribute y, he should be increasingly
satisﬁed. In short, the preference ordering induced by
satisfaction degrees is a (potentially) piecewise nonmono-
tonic function consisting of 5 segments.
2
To illustrate these concepts, consider the following example
from our accommodation renting scenario. Suppose d ¼ tðrÞ
is a tradeoff strategy between rate r and distance d, then the
following is a preference that a user might have on ðr;tðrÞÞ:
pðr;tðrÞÞ ¼
0i f 2 0 0 proarate;
r   arate
brate   arate
if arateprobrate;
1i f brateprpcrate;
drate   r
drate   crate
if crateorpdrate;
0i f drateorp380;
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
(1)
where arate;brate;crate,a n ddrate are constants chosen from the
range of attribute rate. The above preference on tradeoff
alternatives can be clearly visualised (see Fig. 4 for an
example). In Fig. 4, point C on the trapezoid curve
corresponds to rate d260 and then from point C we can see
the corresponding value of distance i sa b o u t2 0m i n .T h a ti s ,
the tradeoff alternative corresponding to C is
ðrate;distanceÞ¼ð 260;20Þ which the renter is completely
satisﬁed with (shown on the lower graph). Similarly, we can
see that the tradeoff alternative at point D ðrate;distanceÞ¼
ð320;15Þ also completely satisﬁes the user. Furthermore, the
renter is completely satisﬁed with all the alternatives on
segment CD of the tradeoff curve according to the trapezoid
curve.
This method of representing preferences (as shown in the
lower part of Fig. 4) was chosen because of its expressive
power. Speciﬁcally, trapezoid formula (1) can model the
following types of preferences (by adjusting its four
parameters):
  in the case arate ¼ brate ¼ crateodrate, it models a
decreasing preference on the set of tradeoff alternatives
ðr;tðrÞÞ;
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Fig. 4. The preference on tradeoff alternatives on the curve of tradeoff
strategy.
2Arguably, the function can have other numbers of segments. For
example, the segment number of the preference function in Fig. 4 can be
changed to 6, where segment CD becomes shorter (260–290, ﬂat at ‘‘fully
satisﬁed’’), assume a D0 such that DD0 is 290–320 (decreasing), assume an
E0 such that D0E0 is 320–325 (ﬂat at ‘‘OK’’), and E0E is 325–350
(decreasing). In fact, the more segments are allowed, the smoother the
function becomes, and the more easily to represent equal alternatives (i.e.,
assigned the same satisfaction degrees at different levels rather than only
at ‘‘fully satisfaction’’). However, in this paper we assume the function
consists of ﬁve segments and leave the case of more segments as future
work.
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increasing preference on the set of tradeoff alternatives
ðr;tðrÞÞ;
  in the case arateobrate ¼ crateodrate, it models a pre-
ference that is increasing between ðarate;tðarateÞÞ and
ðbrate;tðbrateÞÞ but decreasing between ðcrate;tðcrateÞÞ and
ðdrate;tðdrateÞÞ; and
  in the case arateobrateocrateodrate, it models a pre-
ference that is increasing between ðarate;tðarateÞÞ and
ðbrate;tðbrateÞÞ, decreasing between ðcrate;tðcrateÞÞ and
ðdrate;tðdrateÞÞ, and reaching the maximum preference
level between ðbrate, tðbrateÞÞ and ðcrate;tðcrateÞÞ.
3. The default-then-adjust acquisition method
In the previous section, we presented the basic concepts
of tradeoff strategies and preferences. Given these, we can
now present our default-then-adjust method for acquiring
them. The overall method is detailed in Fig. 5 and in the
rest of this section we outline the main constituent
components.
First, the system queries the user about choice features in
order to determine which attributes to tradeoff (lines 6–10).
For example, in the accommodation renting scenario, a
renter (buyer) can consult the system about how to reduce
the rental rate by means of a tradeoff. The system could
query him about related attributes that could be used to
tradeoff (e.g., take accommodation that is further away
from his place of study or for a longer rental period). Then
if the user indicates that he is willing to take the
accommodation that is further away, the system will
suggest making the tradeoff between distance and rate.I f
the user has no ﬁrm idea, the system can analyse with him
according to its knowledge base of choice rules (see Section
4.1 for examples of such rules).
Second, in order to shape the tradeoff strategy, the
system initially presents a default (lines 11–14). Then it
pretends it is a seller and makes a number of concessions
on one attribute and asks the user (buyer) for the limit of
the other attribute he would be willing to worsen to
compensate (lines 21–24).
3 It then re-shapes the tradeoff
strategy according to the user’s adjustments (lines 16–20).
Later on, the user can make more adjustments in this way
(lines 16–20) or he can ask the system to set the tradeoff
strategy back to its default (lines 30–34). For example, in
the accommodation renting scenario, the system plays
the role of an estate agency (seller) by asking the
renter (buyer) the maximum distance he can accept if the
rental rate is decreased from £380 to £350 pcm, and then
what if it is further reduced from £350 to £290 pcm, and
then to £230 pcm. Making adjustments in this way means
the space of alternatives is explored reasonably system-
atically and, as discussed in Section 1, is consistent with the
negotiation game advocated in standard negotiation
theory.
Third, the system can re-shape the default tradeoff
preference according to the user’s adjustment of the four
parameters (see Deﬁnition 2 and formula (1)) that
conﬁgure the tradeoff preference on the alternatives in
the strategy set (lines 25–28). Also, at any point of the
process, the user can ask the system to set the tradeoff
preference back to its default (lines 32–34).
Finally, we can see that after adjusting the tradeoff
preference a number of times, the user can go back to
adjust the tradeoff strategy again. Also, the user can go
back to any previous point of the acquisition process or
even to re-start it all again (lines 35–38).
In more detail, the system consists of two knowledge
bases and several functions that are explained as follows.
The knowledge bases that are applied in the acquisition
process are a set of choice rules and a set of adjustment
questions (examples of both for our accommodation
scenario are given in Sections 4.1 and 4.2). In this context,
a choice rule is used to choose the attributes between which
a potential tradeoff might exist. The condition part of a
choice rule consists of some choice features that the system
will ask a user to conﬁrm or deny, while its conclusion part
speciﬁes the attributes between which the tradeoff exists.
We can have such rules because various attributes between
which tradeoffs exist have been identiﬁed in human
negotiation theory (Steel and Beasor, 1999; Unt, 1999;
Volkema, 1999). For example, in business negotiation,
tradeoffs often exist between price and quality, between
price and quantity, and so on. An adjusting question is used
to help users to obtain their desired tradeoff strategy and to
think about the way this strategy is structured. Such
questions are of the form of how much the user (buyer) is
willing to worsen one attribute to get another improved by
the sellers. For example, what is the maximum distance to
the university the student (buyer) is willing to accept if the
estate agency (seller) decreases the rental rate from £290 to
£230 pcm?
The functions that are employed in the acquisition
process are as follows. (i) Function choice-inference (a)
gives the questions of whether a component of the
condition part of a choice rule holds in order to choose
the attributes that a tradeoff should be made between (i.e.,
the conclusion part of a choice rule), and (b) chooses the
attributes according to the user’s replies. (ii) Function
default-strategy plots the default strategy of the tradeoff
between the chosen attributes. (iii) Function
default-preference plots the default preference on the
tradeoff alternatives in the tradeoff strategy set. (iv)
Function s-reshape re-plots the tradeoff strategy curve
(it is the default at the beginning) according to the user’s
adjustment to the attributes’ values. That is, the segments
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the acquisition system) to reveal such information to his opponent (the
seller whom the system pretends to be). However, the system is actually
not the buyer’s opponent, rather it is on buyer’s side (being an interface to
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unchanged, but the segment that links the left and right
points that are nearest to the user’s current adjusting point
is replaced by two segments that link the left point to the
adjusting point and then to the right point. We can do this
because the tradeoff strategy is assumed to be continuous
(see Deﬁnition 1). (v) Function update keeps the shape of
the tradeoff preference but resets the updated set of
tradeoff alternatives (i.e., the updated tradeoff strategy).
(vi) Function get-adjust-question gets a new question from
the adjustment question set. (vii) Function p-reshape re-
plots the preference on tradeoff alternatives in the tradeoff
strategy set according to the user’s adjustments of the
preference conﬁguration parameters (see Deﬁnition 2 and
formula (1)). (viii) Function present sends the user the
queries generated by the system about the attribute choice,
tradeoff strategy and preference. (ix) Function receive
reads in the user’s responses about attribute choice,
tradeoff strategy adjusting points, and the preference
conﬁguration points. It also reads in the user’s requests
for setting back to the default tradeoff strategy and
preference and for restarting or ending the acquisition
process.
Finally, we discuss how the user communicates with the
acquisition agent system. Since the human user can also be
regarded as an agent (although not a software one), the
communication interface between the acquisition agent and
its user consists of a set of messages they send to one
another. As is common in the ﬁeld of agent communication
(Willmott et al., 2000), we separate the representation of
these messages into the communication language level and
the content language level.
In the former case, we adopt the KQML standard (Finin
et al., 1994) with several minor additions. Speciﬁcally, we
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can:
  ask the user to answer a choice question (line 10),
  tell the user the default tradeoff strategy and
preference are ready (lines 11 and 33) for him to adjust,
  show the user the reshaped strategy (line 19) and
reshaped preference (line 27), and
  ask the user to adjust strategy (lines 23);
and through which the user can:
  tell the acquisition agent that he is ready to adjust
the tradeoff strategy (line 15),
  ask the acquisition agent to reshape strategy (lines
15 and 16) and reshape preference (line 25)
according to his adjustments,
  ask the acquisition agent to reset the default
strategy (lines 29–30) and the default prefer-
ence (line 29), and
  ask the acquisition agent to restart (line 35) or end
(line 40) the whole acquisition process with the acquired
tradeoff strategy and preference.
In the latter case, a query of the acquisition agent is a piece
of information about a choice question (line 9), tradeoff
strategy or preference (lines 14, 20, 28, and 34), or an
adjustment question (line 22). A user’s response is a piece
of information about a reply to a choice question (line 7), a
reply to an adjustment question (line 17), or an adjustment
to the tradeoff strategy (line 17) or preference (line 26).
4. Prototype for an accommodation renting scenario
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our method for
acquiring negotiation tradeoff strategies and preferences,
we have implemented a prototype system for the accom-
modation renting scenario. Speciﬁcally, we consider the
case in which a prospective tenant (student, the buyer)
wants to rent accommodation from a real estate agent (the
seller). As outlined in Section 3, the acquisition process
consists of three stages: (i) choosing the attributes between
which the tradeoff should be made (Section 4.1), (ii)
shaping the user’s strategy for tradeoffs between the chosen
attributes (Section 4.2), and (iii) shaping the preferences on
the tradeoff alternatives (Section 4.3). Each of these will
now be dealt with in turn before we present some general
remarks about the system (Section 4.4).
4.1. Choosing which attributes to tradeoff
In this stage (see Fig. 6), the system carries out a
structured interview (an organised communication (Schrei-
ber et al., 2000)) with the user. According to choice rules,
the system asks the user questions and then maps the user’s
response information into attributes between which the
tradeoff can be made. This mapping is performed in the
following manner. The system puts a question in a dialogue
box and after the user chooses an answer (that is the text
canned in the box), the box disappears. However, the
transcript of the whole conversion is recorded and
displayed in order for the user to trace and analyse the
choice process. The knowledge that the system uses at this
stage consists of the choice rules and their explanations. In
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 6. Structured interview for choosing which attributes to tradeoff.
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allows the user to understand the system’s advice on how
to choose among the negotiation attributes. In fact, if users
can understand the system’s behaviour well, their trust in
the system will increase. When the ﬁrst stage is over, the
system will direct the user to the second stage. The system
also sets up a ‘‘Restart’’ button for the user to re-start the
choice process in case he changes his mind (which he can
do at any stage of the acquisition process).
The choice rules that the system uses at this stage consist
of two parts: condition and conclusion. The condition part
involves attributes: (1) moving taking value in f‘‘mind’’, ‘‘do
not mind’’, ‘‘neutral’’g that the user is allowed to use to
answer the system’s enquiry about how much he minds
moving, and (2) spare-time taking value in f‘‘a lot’’, ‘‘a
little’’, ‘‘some’’g that the user is allowed to use to answer the
system’s enquiry about how busy he is. All the possible
combinations of two attributes are put into consideration
in these rules, and so there is only ever one rule that is
applicable. The conclusion part is the suggestion that
between which attributes among frate;period;distanceg the
tradeoff should be made. More speciﬁcally, the rules are as
follows:
4
R1 : IF moving ¼ ‘‘do not mind’’ ^ spare-time ¼ ‘‘some’’
THEN use ‘‘tradeoff between rate and period’’ .
R2 : IF moving ¼ ‘‘do not mind’’ ^ spare-time ¼ ‘‘a lot’’
THEN use ‘‘tradeoff between rate and period’’ .
R3 : IF moving ¼ ‘‘do not mind’’ ^ spare-time ¼ ‘‘a little’’
THEN use ‘‘tradeoff between rate and distance’’ .
R4 : IF moving ¼ ‘‘neutral’’ ^ spare-time ¼ ‘‘a lot’’
THEN use ‘‘tradeoff between rate and period’’ .
R5 : IF moving ¼ ‘‘neutral’’ ^ spare-time ¼ ‘‘some’’
THEN use ‘‘tradeoff between rate and period’’ .
R6 : IF moving ¼ ‘‘neutral’’ ^ spare-time ¼ ‘‘a little’’
THEN use ‘‘tradeoff between rent and distance’’ .
R7 : IF moving ¼ ‘‘mind’’
THEN use ‘‘tradeoff between rate and distance’’ .
The explanations of the above rules are as follows:
Rules 1, 2, 4 and 5: Since the user does not mind moving
frequently (Rules 1 and 2) or the user is neutral about
moving frequently (Rules 4 and 5), if the rental rate is very
high he would prefer renting the accommodation for a
short period ﬁrst while he endeavours to ﬁnd a cheaper
one. Although this may take a considerable amount of
time, he can do this because he has some (Rules 1 and 5) or
a lot (Rules 2 and 4).
Rules 3 and 6: Since the user is neutral about moving
frequently, if the rental rate is very high, it should be ﬁne
for him to take the accommodation for a short period ﬁrst
and ﬁnd a cheaper one later on. However, this may take a
considerable amount of time and this is problematic (since
he has only a little spare time). So, it would be better for
him to reduce the rental rate by taking accommodation
that is further away.
Rule 7: Since the user objects to moving frequently, it is
not a good idea to suggest to him to take the expensive
accommodation for a short period ﬁrst and then move to a
cheaper one later. Rather, it is better for him to take the
accommodation further away to get the rental rate down.
4.2. Shaping the tradeoff strategy
After the stage of choosing the tradeoff attributes has
been completed, the system moves the user onto the
stage of determining the tradeoff strategy (see Fig. 7). To
this end, the system ﬁrst asks the user a number questions
to help him adjust the points along the tradeoff
strategy curve (e.g., adjust point ðdistance;rateÞ¼ð 5;350Þ
to ðdistance;rateÞ¼ð 13:9;350Þ, see Fig. 7). These questions
are: what is the maximum distance or period he can accept
if the rental rate is decreased from £380 to £350 pcm, and
then what if it is further reduced from £350 to £290 pcm,
and then to £230 pcm? Then, the user can further adjust
any other points he choose simply by clicking on the
relevant points and dragging them to the desired positions.
If the user is satisﬁed with the curve shape of the tradeoff
strategy, he can press button ‘‘Satisﬁed’’ and the system
directs him to the next stage (see Fig. 8); otherwise he can
continue to adjust the curve until he is satisﬁed. During the
adjustment process, the user can press button ‘‘Back’’ to
retrieve the previous adjustment, button ‘‘Default’’ to go
back to the original default tradeoff strategy,
5 button
‘‘Restart’’ to restart the whole process.
4.3. Shaping the tradeoff preference
After the stage of shaping the tradeoff strategy is over,
the system moves onto shaping the tradeoff preference (see
Fig. 9). Thus, the system shapes the user’s preference on
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4These rules could be acquired for a given domain by using some
relatively standard knowledge discovery methods. For example, the rough
set theory as detailed in Pawlak (1982, 1991) provides a theoretic basis for
discovering decision rules from sample data. Here the choice rules are a
kind of decision rules since they indicate under which condition which
attributes the users should tradeoff between. Thus, rough set theory can be
employed to generate such choice rules. However, this is beyond the scope
of this paper and in this case they were developed manually based on
domain expertise.
5The default strategy is ﬁxed to be a decreasing line meaning that the
degree to which one attribute is worsened is the same as the degree to
which another attribute is improved (see Fig. 3). In this case, the two
attributes are assumed to be equally important. If the user does not think
so, he can adjust to a concave or a convex curve (see Figs. 1 and 2). If a
concave or a convex curve was chosen as the default strategy, intuitively
the user might feel confused: why did the system think I had viewed one
particular attribute being more important than another at the beginning of
adjustment process when it has no information about my tastes? Thus, the
decreasing line is chosen since it assumes the user is neutral about the
attributes under consideration.
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tradeoff preference parameters (see Deﬁnition 2). This can
be performed by adjusting the sliders of points B, C, D and
E or ﬁlling in their values in the corresponding boxes.
If the user does not fully understand the meaning of the
preference curve, the ‘‘Explain’’ button gives the following
extra details:
Segment AB: Tradeoff alternatives in this segment are
unsuitable. This is because the attribute (e.g., period or
distance) that is worsened (to improve the other) is beyond
the maximum limit the user is willing to accept (even
though the other (e.g., rate) can be made even better).
Segment BC: Tradeoff alternatives in this segment are
preferred increasingly. This is because the attribute
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Fig. 8. Displaying the tradeoff strategy and directing the user to the stage of shaping the tradeoff preference.
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other) is becoming increasingly acceptable although the
other attribute (e.g., rate) is worsening (a little).
Segment CD: Tradeoff alternatives in this segment are
the most preferred (completely satisfactory). At this point,
for example, the rate is not too high and the other attribute
(period or distance) is also quite satisfactory.
Segment DE: Tradeoff alternatives in this segment are
preferred decreasingly when the attribute (e.g., rate)
approaches the maximum limit the user is willing to
accept. This is because the attribute (e.g., rate) to be traded
off is becoming increasingly unacceptable although the
other attribute (period or distance) is improving.
Segment EF: Tradeoff alternatives in this segment are
absolutely unacceptable because the attribute (e.g., rate) is
beyond the user’s maximum limit (e.g., the user’s budget)
even though the other attribute might be very good.
4.4. General remarks
Having outlined our system and how it operates, we ﬁrst
evaluate it from a qualitative perspective (the quantitative
evaluation is given in Section 5). Now according to Turban
and Aronson (1998), there are a number of objectives that
a knowledge acquisition system should possess. These
include:
  The ability to acquire knowledge directly from the user
(not through a human knowledge engineer). The system
developed in this paper functions as an experienced
knowledge engineer that interviews the human users
directly in order to obtain information about their
tradeoff strategies and preferences.
  A tutorial ability. Generally speaking, the capability of
explanation for behaviour is an essential component in
knowledge based systems (Schreiber et al., 2000). For
this reason, we set up the ‘‘Explain’’ button so the users
can check the rationale of the system’s advice about the
choice of tradeoff attributes and the shape of the
tradeoff strategies and preferences. Such explanations
help the users to use the system efﬁciently and to trust
the system’s advice.
  The ability to analyse work in progress so that users can
detect inconsistencies and gaps (if any) in knowledge.
6
The explanation facility, the interview record, the
system’s instruction record, and the graphical user
interface serve this purpose. This is because these
facilities enable the user to trace and analyse the
information provided to the system and to recap the
way in which the system responded.
  A user friendly interface. A key component here is the
ability to interact ﬂexibly with users. Accordingly, we
designed the system as an autonomous agent that
provides the required ﬂexibility by directing its users
through the various steps of the acquisition process and
by allowing the users to go back to any previous points
at any time. More speciﬁcally, users can re-press any
previous buttons and re-adjust the previous tradeoff
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Fig. 9. Adjusting preference parameters and explaining their meaning.
6In our future work, we plan to add a functionality of automatic
inconsistency checking and adjusting. Currently, in the stages of acquiring
tradeoff strategies and preferences there is an assumption that the result of
adjustment process is roughly consistent with the users’ tradeoff strategies
and preferences. Our technique does not actually ask the user for a
consistency check at each point in the graphs of tradeoff strategy and
preference, but that consistency is already implied through the user’s
visual inspection of graphs.
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accordingly.
5. Empirical evaluation
This section presents our empirical evaluation of our
prototype system. Generally speaking, there is a lack of
well-established evaluation approaches in the development
and assessment of knowledge acquisition techniques
(Shadbolt et al., 1999). So, we cannot carry out our
evaluation experiment according to a standard approach.
On the other hand, the success criteria should clearly reﬂect
end-user concerns (Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984; Gasch-
nig et al., 1983). Thus, we focus on investigating the
following properties:
(i) whether it is easy for the users to understand and
master the system,
(ii) whether the system is helpful for the users to specify
their tradeoff strategies and preferences, and
(iii) whether the system is efﬁcient in accurately acquiring
tradeoff strategies and preferences.
To measure the extent to which the ﬁrst two properties are
achieved, we can ask the users for their subjective opinions
after they use the system (Section 5.1). The ﬁnal property
can be measured by taking into account the number of
interactions that occurred between the system and the users
before the user was happy with the results that were
reached (Section 5.2).
In order to determine the number of user samples
necessary to do a comprehensive analysis, we borrow on
the principle advocated by Menzies (1998):
Sample size (N) should be carefully controlled. Small
sample sizes are hard to analyse. However, as random
sample sizes get larger, they approach a bell shape (the
normal distribution) which is a well-understood dis-
tribution. In practise, N greater than 20 is acceptable
and N greater than 30 is encouraged. On the other hand,
there may be no beneﬁt with making N very large
(Cohen also argues that sample sizes of N greater than
50 can be pointless (Cohen, 1995, p. 116)).
Accordingly, we have chosen a sample size of 40 users in
our experiments. They are undergraduates, master stu-
dents, Ph.D. students and research fellows in both
computer science and other disciplines (the number of
computer scientists in the population was about 45%).
Among these, eight tried earlier versions of the system and
provided their feedback that was used to get the system
into the present form; while the remainder used the system
for the ﬁrst time. For the ﬁrst time users, before they
evaluated the system, they were given some simple
documentation about the system and how it works, and
they were also given a brief tutorial (lasting about 5min).
5.1. Subjective opinions
After the users have used our system, we ask them
whether they agree, neither agree nor disagree,o rdisagree
for the following statements:
  Clear: the system’s organisation is clear.
  Reliable: the system’s implementation is reliable.
  Friendly: the system’s behaviour is easy to understand
and follow.
  Easy to use: the system is easy to operate.
  Convincing: the system’s explanation of its decisions and
components is clear and convincing.
  Professional: the system’s advice is professional.
  Helpful: without the system’s help, it would not have
been easy to articulate tradeoff strategies and prefer-
ences.
  Like it: overall rating of the system.
Fig. 10shows the summary of the users’ responses to the
above criteria. From this, we can clearly see that for most
of the users, our system is helpful in specifying their
tradeoff strategies and preferences and it is easy for them to
understand and master our system. Since most users are
ﬁrst timers and the introduction to the system and its
operation is comparatively brief, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that the scores for the Clear, Friendly and Convincing
criteria are a bit lower than those for some of the other
criteria since these are the thing that usually come with
time. Indeed for the non-ﬁrst time users the average values
for these criteria were, respectively, about 87%, 85% and
75% that are higher than the corresponding ﬁgures for the
ﬁrst timers.
5.2. Accuracy versus efﬁciency
Now we turn our focus to discussing the evaluation of
our system in terms of its accuracy with respect to the
amount of information it has elicited. Of course, if the user
was asked for everything, then we could assume the
acquired result is accurate. However, this is impossible in
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Fig. 10. Users’ satisfaction with the tradeoff acquisition system.
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nations of the values of two attributes that take values on
the continuous intervals. Thus, in this evaluation, we aim
to determine how much information the system needs to
have a good enough (from the user’s perspective) view of
his tradeoff strategies and preferences.
First of all, since different users have different tradeoff
strategies and preferences (this is simply commonsense),
there does not exist a standard tradeoff strategy and a set
of preferences (if this were not true, the whole acquisition
process would become unnecessary). Thus, it is impossible
to measure the accuracy of the acquired tradeoff strategies
and preferences against standard ones.
Given this, the next step is to determine whether we can
measure the accuracy to which the acquired tradeoff
strategies and preferences are consistent with users’ order-
ings of the accommodation instances. There are also some
problems here. Suppose in the evaluation experiment, we
ask users to specify a preference ordering on a number of
accommodation instances or simply put these instances into
piles of likes, dislikes, and neutral. Experience dictates that it
is a kind of overall preference ordering that takes into
account all the attributes of accommodation (e.g., distance,
rental period, rental rate, location, and so on) (Mas-Collell
et al., 1995). Therefore, it is not appropriate to compare the
user’s speciﬁed instance preference ordering with the one
that is implied by the acquired tradeoff preference only. This
is because just some (e.g., rental rate and distance only, not
all of them) of the attributes are considered in the acquired
tradeoff preferences. Thus, in order to obtain the instance
preference ordering that the acquired preference implies, we
have to aggregate not only the tradeoff preference, but also
the preference on all other attributes. However, there are
many aggregation operators that could be used to do this,
each of which will result in different ordering on users’
instances (Dubois and Prade, 2004), and none of which are
clearly dominant for this problem.
In the case that the user is simply required to sort a
number of accommodation instances into the piles (instead
of a complete preference ordering), even more problems
arise. First, somebody who has little in the way of domain
knowledge (e.g., an international student who has just
arrived in the UK) may be unable to make informed
choices. Second, the terms like, dislike and neutral are
typical fuzzy concepts. So, after aggregating individual
attributes’ assessments of an accommodation, we need to
map the overall assessment into one of the fuzzy piles of
like, dislike and neutral in order to check whether the user’s
direct sorting of accommodation instances is consistent
with that which follows from the acquired preferences.
Here two more problems arise: (i) how to deﬁne the fuzzy
sets of like, dislike and neutral, and (ii) how to map an
accommodation’s overall assessment (according to all the
individual preferences) into one of these fuzzy sets. Now,
neither of these have a standard answer and the various
options all provide different overall outcomes (Dubois and
Prade, 2000).
From this, it should be obvious that it is extremely
difﬁcult to ﬁnd an objective way of measuring the accuracy
of the acquired tradeoff preferences. Thus, we consider
subjective ways. Intuitively, if a user is satisﬁed with the
tradeoff strategies and preferences that the system
acquired, it is difﬁcult to say that the accuracy of our
acquisition system is not good. Thus, when a user is
satisﬁed with the acquired result, we say the system has
accurately acquired the user’s tradeoff strategies and
preferences.
Now only one problem remains. That is, how do we
measure the amount of information the user has had to put
into the system? To this end, since the more interactions
there are between the system and the user, the more
information the user provides, the number of interactions
is indicative of the amount of information the user provides
during the course of the acquisition process. Here, the
lower the number of interactions, the more efﬁcient the
system. Thus, we measure the number of interactions that
happen before the user is satisﬁed with the tradeoff strategy
and preference.
In more detail, Fig. 11 shows the result of the number of
interactions between users and our acquisition system.
7
From this, we can clearly see that large numbers of
interactions are not required at any stage of the acquisition
process. In fact, at the attribute choice stage, the average
number of interactions is 4:33. At the tradeoff strategy
shaping stage, the average number is 8:39; more than 30%
people interact ﬁve or six times and less than 15% people
do it 15 or 17 times. And at the tradeoff preference shaping
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Fig. 11. Interaction numbers when satisfactory results are obtained.
7In the attribute choice stage, one interaction is when the system asks
the user a question and then he replies, when the user presses an ‘‘Explain’’
button and the system explains its advice, or when the user presses the
‘‘Restart’’ button. In the strategy shaping stage, an interaction is when the
system asks the user an adjustment question and they respond by clicking
a point along the current strategy curve and dragging it to the desired
position, when the user directly clicks a point along the current strategy
curve and drags it to the desired position, or when the user presses button
‘‘Satisﬁed’’, ‘‘Back’’, or ‘‘Default’’. In the preference shaping stage, an
interaction is an adjustment that the user performs on one of the
parameters that conﬁgure the preference curve, or when they press one of
the ‘‘Default’’, ‘‘Explain’’, and ‘‘OK’’ buttons.
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interact more than 10 times. Interestingly, the users who
made high numbers of interactions with the systems often
had a non-computer science background. We believe they
made such frequent changes because their backgrounds
made them hesitant in operating the system and thus they
cannot focus themselves on thinking about their tradeoff
strategies and preferences. Generally speaking, however,
these results show that our default-then-adjust method is
efﬁcient.
Now, in order to get a clearer idea about how good our
acquisition method is in terms of efﬁciency, we compare it
with a couple of alternatives. First, we consider the
simple approach of constructing tradeoff alternatives by
iterating over all possible value combinations of attributes
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1983). Considering the situation of
two attributes as an example, suppose they have n and m
possible values, respectively. Then the total number of all
possible combinations is n   m. Clearly, only in the case
that the space of all possible combinations is small enough,
is it practical to require the user to give an ordering of all
the combinations. Actually, in our method, the average
number of adjustments is 8:39 þ 6:39 ¼ 14:78 (the attribute
choice stage is not involved). Whereas in the simple
approach, as long as each attribute has more than four
possible values, the times that its users need to provide
information is more than 4   4 ¼ 16. For example, in our
accommodation renting domain (Luo et al., 2004), suppose
attribute distance has 11 possible values 0;3;6;...;30, and
attribute rental rate also has 11 possible values 0;ð0;250 ;
ð250;260 ;ð260;270 ;...;ð320;330 ;ð330;1Þ. Then, the
times that its users need to provide information is more
than 11   11 ¼ 121. In other words, it is much less efﬁcient
than ours (considering in our approach the possible
combinations are inﬁnite, rather than ﬁnite).
Next, we consider the exhaustive method (Luo et al.,
2004). In the exhaustive method, the value combination of
two attributes in a tradeoff strategy must obey the property
that if one attribute’s value is worsened, then another’s
must be improved. Thus, for the best value of the attribute
with n possible values, the number of the possible
combinations with another attribute with m possible values
is m; for its second best value, the number is m   1;...;for
its worse value, the number is m   n þ 1 (assuming
m4n   1). So, the total number of tradeoff combinations
is:
m þð m   1Þþ   þð m   n þ 1Þ¼m   n  
ðn   1Þn
2
pm   n.
The above analysis shows that although the idea of the
exhaustive method is to systematically explore the space of
possible combinations that obey the tradeoff property
above, this does not mean the user has to check all possible
combinations of attributes (as per the simple approach).
Therefore, the exhaustive method is more efﬁcient than the
simple one. However, it is clear that the method proposed
in this paper is still much more efﬁcient than the exhaustive
method. In fact, in the exhaustive method, as long as each
attribute has more than six possible values, the times its
users need to provide information is more than
6   6  ð 6   1Þ6=2 ¼ 21, which is larger than that of our
approach (which was 14.78). Taking the above ﬁgures for
our accommodation renting domain, then the amount of
times that its users need to provide information is
11   11  ð 11   1Þ11=2 ¼ 66. This is clearly less than the
121 of the simple method but far less than the average
ﬁgure of 14.78 of our method.
6. Related work
The background of our work is knowledge acquisition
and preference elicitation. Generally speaking, there are
many methods for acquiring knowledge from the users of
knowledge-based systems (see Hoffman and Shadbolt,
1995 for an overview). However, usually such methods do
not aim to elicit user strategies and preferences for decision
making (particularly for dynamic decision making pro-
cesses such as negotiation). There is, however, some work
in this area. The most common methods elicit a user’s
preferences by means of utility functions. For instance, in
gambling elicitation techniques (Neumann and Morgen-
stern, 1944) the utility of one outcome is ascertained by
comparing it to a lottery involving two others, and in visual
exploration and incremental utility elicitation (Blythe,
2002) suggestions are made visually to a human user based
on an incomplete model of their utility function and the
model is updated based on the received feedback. However,
the workload of users in using such methods can be very
high.
In order to reduce this workload, a number of heuristic
methods have been proposed. For example, case based
preference elicitation (Ha and Haddawy, 1998, 2003; Ha et
al., 2001) requires a user to provide partial information
about their preference and then the system constructs the
whole preference structure by choosing the most similar
one in the case base of preference structure. In contrast,
preference elicitation via theory reﬁnement (Geisler et al.,
2001; Restiﬁcar et al., 2002; Haddawy et al., 2003) starts
with an approximate and incomplete body of domain
knowledge and then corrects inaccuracies and incomplete-
ness by training on examples. However, such preference
elicitation methods are also unsuitable in this context
(although a procedure of negotiation can certainly be
viewed as one of dynamic decision making over time). This
is because in the case of the preference elicitation for
ordinary decision making (Ha et al., 2001; Ha and
Haddawy, 2003), the term preference refers to orderings
on a set of alternatives, and the focus is basically on
eliciting the ordering (assuming the alternatives are known
or given). In contrast, in this paper, our focus is on actually
eliciting the user’s tradeoff alternatives. As to the problem
of eliciting the ordering on the set of tradeoff alternatives,
we use an adjusting parameter method (thus, in future
work, we can take advantage of general preference ordering
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strategies and preferences).
Tradeoff strategies and preferences can also be viewed
as a form of constraint (i.e., such a constraint is the set of
the value combinations of attributes between which the
tradeoff is made and each combination is assigned a
preference level) (Luo et al., 2003b; Perloff, 1998).
However, while existing techniques for constraint elicita-
tion have shown some success in particular contexts,
they are not easily able to handle our tradeoff
acquisition problem. For example, in O’Connell et al.
(2002), O’Connell, O’Sullivan and Freuder present an
approach to interactive constraint acquisition based on the
techniques of Mitchell’s List-Then-Eliminate method
(Mitchell, 1997). In this approach, there is a ‘‘hypothesis
space’’ of constraints over which a general-to-speciﬁc
ordering is known (or is implicit in the hypothesis space
representation). Then the user’s examples (where a
constraint should be met or violated) are used to eliminate
hypotheses that are inconsistent with the examples. In this
procedure, a strategy is also employed to minimise the
dialogue length between the user and the computer system.
However, this method is only applicable to crisp con-
straints, but buyers’ tradeoff strategies and preferences are
often fuzzy constraints (Luo et al., 2003b). In Biso et al.
(2000), Biso, Rossi and Sperduti used neural networks to
tackle the problem of soft constraint acquisition (fuzzy
constraints are a special case of soft constraints). However,
their method is used to learn the solution rating function
given a ﬁxed constraint graph and some examples of
solution ratings. Thus, their method assumes the
constraints are already available, and what their method
learns is just how to rate a solution according to the
available constraints. It does not resolve the problem of
how to acquire soft constraints themselves (in particular,
the fuzzy constraints of buyers’ tradeoff strategies and
preferences).
Probably the work that is most related to ours is Freuder
and O’Sullivan (2001). They aim to acquire tradeoffs
between the attributes that conﬁgure an object. However,
there are a number of important differences. Firstly, their
method uses heuristic strategies to generate various trade-
offs and then asks the user to conﬁrm whether they are
acceptable (their aim is to improve the efﬁciency of the
acquisition process). This approach may cause some
tradeoffs to be missed in complex multi-dimensional spaces
and so we put the whole space of tradeoff alternatives into
consideration. Secondly, their method is not designed for
negotiation problems, and, their example scenario, the
N-Queens problem, is much more objective (i.e., indepen-
dent of users’ individual opinions) than that typically
found in negotiations. Finally, their method assumes that
each tradeoff alternative is equivalent (i.e., users have no
preference on alternatives), whereas we assume that for
different tradeoff alternatives the user has different
satisfaction degrees (i.e., the user has a preference on
tradeoff alternatives).
Turning now to the area of agent-based automated
negotiation. As noted previously, little work has been done
to address the acquisition problem of the strategies and
preferences of the human users for whom the negotiating
agents are acting. Nevertheless:
  In Hudson and Sandholm (2002), Restiﬁcar and
Haddawy (2003), different methods have been devel-
oped for one agent to elicit preferences from another
agent in combinatorial auction and bilateral negotiation
settings, respectively. However, they both assume that
the users of the agents have already imparted their
preferences into the negotiating agents (the aim of our
work presented in this paper). Thus, the aim of the
elicitation process in Hudson and Sandholm (2002) is to
prune the auctioneer agent’s search space; and in
Restiﬁcar and Haddawy (2003) the negotiating partner’s
preference models are used to predict its behaviour
during the course of negotiation.
  In Boutilier et al. (2003), negotiation and preference
elicitation are linked. However, this work differs from ours
in the following aspects. (i) Their preference elicitation is
not from human users but from programs (i.e., an
automated resource manager program elicits the prefer-
ences on resources from workload manager programs). In
contrast, the aim of our work is to elicit tradeoff strategies
and preferences directly from automated negotiation
programs’ users. (ii) Their preference elicitation process is
a cooperative negotiation between an automated resource
manager and the workload managers. In other words, the
motivation of the elicitation is not for a program to
negotiate faithfully on behalf of its human owner (the
motivation of our work). Rather, the motivation of
Boutilier et al. (2003) is to ﬁnd near-optimal allocations
of resources to distinct computing elements in large,
distributed computing systems.
  In previous work (Castro-Schez et al., 2004), we used
fuzzy repertory tables mainly for acquiring the rewards
and restrictions that a seller has on speciﬁc products for
a speciﬁc negotiation model that we have developed
(Luo et al., 2003b). However, this method does not deal
with a buyer’s tradeoff strategies nor preferences.
  The work of Guo et al. (2003) employs an evolutionary
algorithm to address the problem of preference elicita-
tion (in the form of utility functions) for multi-attribute
negotiation. However, their term preference does not
particularly refer to tradeoff preference. As a result,
Guo et al. (2003) cannot easily be distinguished from the
general research area of user preference elicitation.
Finally, by way of adjusting the default curves for tradeoff
strategies and preferences, the method developed in this
paper removed the limitations of our two previous
methods—the exhaustive (Luo et al., 2004) and the
knowledge-based method (Luo et al., 2003a), while keeping
their advantages. In fact, in the former case, systematically
exploring the space of all possible tradeoff alternatives
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are large (as shown in Section 5.2). Thus, in this case, for
practical purposes, one cannot assume the user will answer
all the required comparisons willingly and accurately. To
remove this limitation, the acquisition method proposed in
this paper reduces the user’s workload by offering defaults
to kick start the process, and then lets the user do any
necessary adjustments until he is satisﬁed. Moreover, our
empirical evaluation conﬁrms that most users actually
perform a small number of adjustments before satisfactory
results are obtained. On the other hand, our system keeps
the ﬂexibility of the exhaustive method that users can
specify any shape of tradeoff strategy and preference they
wish. In the latter case, the knowledge-based method
reduced the workload by restricting the users to only make
a choice among a number of ﬁxed tradeoff strategies.
However, this lacks the ﬂexibility of allowing the user to
adjust the defaults presented to them.
7. Conclusions and future work
In order for autonomous agents to negotiate faithfully
on behalf of their human owners, it is critical to elicit
tradeoff strategies and preferences from their owners. We
believe such knowledge is fundamental to many negotia-
tion models, but, to date, it is an area that has been largely
neglected. To this end, we developed a default-then-adjust
knowledge acquisition method and an accompanying
software tool to implement this method. Our method is
consistent with the principles of standard negotiation
theory and can acquire tradeoff strategies and preferences
between pairs of attributes. Our evaluation of the method
and the tool indicates that they are effective, ﬂexible, and
efﬁcient in their task.
However, for the future more work is still needed.
Speciﬁcally:
  The method needs to be examined across a wide range of
domains in order to ensure that it is sufﬁciently generic.
We believe this is the case since there is nothing speciﬁc
to the accommodation renting domain in our model,
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but this hypothesis requires validation.
  There is no objective measure or gold standard against
which the acquired model can be evaluated. Thus, the
success of a given acquisition model can only be
determined by coupling the acquired tradeoff strategies
and preferences to various negotiation models and
evaluating the users’ satisfaction on the outcomes.
However, even in such cases there is the problem of
determining whether any discontent is due to the
behaviour of the negotiation models or whether the
user simply did not fully appreciate the ramiﬁcations of
their tradeoff strategies and preferences.
  We believe that we can learn from work in the general
area of preference elicitation where many heuristic
methods have been be used to reduce the elicitation
workload, and so we wish to explore the use and the
effectiveness of methods other than default-then-adjust.
In addition, our preference ordering function is assumed
to be a (potentially) piecewise nonmonotonic function
consisting of ﬁve segments. However, the more segments
that are allowed, the smoother the function becomes,
and the easier it is to represent equal alternatives (i.e., to
assign the same satisfaction degree at different levels
rather than only at ‘‘fully satisfaction’’). Thus, it is
worth investigating the increased expressiveness that
more segments permit.
  The acquisition of other types of tradeoffs needs further
consideration. Such tradeoffs would deal with (i) more
than pairwise considerations, (ii) non-linear preferences
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(e.g., a user may prefer tradeoff alternative a to tradeoff
alternative b, and tradeoff alternative a to alternative c,
but have no preference ordering between b and c), (iii)
fuzzy curves for tradeoff strategy (e.g., if rate is about
£260 pcm then the distance is about 20min walk and if
rate is about £270 pcm then the distance is about 15min
walk), and (iv) the reality of a breakdown or an impasse
in a negotiation.
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